All Shareholder Letters
The complete collection of Warren Buffett's letters — 88 in total — spanning the Buffett Partnership Ltd. years (1956–1969) and the Berkshire Hathaway chairman letters (1970–2024).
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Berkshire Hathaway Letters
Chairman's letters to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders.
Chairman's Letter — 2024
Berkshire's 2024 letter reports record operating earnings of $47.4 billion (up from $37.4 billion), led by a major jump in insurance earnings. Buffett, now 94, says 'it won't be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO' and that Abel shares the Berkshire creed of honest reporting. Insurance (P/C) is reaffirmed as Berkshire's core business, with float reaching $171 billion (up from $46 billion two decades earlier) and $32 billion of after-tax underwriting profit over 20 years. The letter also pays tribute to Pete Liegl (Forest River) and reiterates the long-term, anti-speculation owner philosophy.
Chairman's Letter — 2023
The 2023 letter opens with a tribute to Charlie Munger, who died on November 28, 2023 — Buffett calls him the architect of Berkshire. Operating earnings hit a record $37.4 billion, and Berkshire now has by far the largest GAAP net worth of any American company ($561 billion). Buffett formally anoints Greg Abel as ready to be CEO 'tomorrow,' details the five Japanese trading-house holdings, and reiterates the danger of treating GAAP net income as reality. He also warns about the 'worst sort' of investment advice and the dependence on a few giants (Apple, insurance, BNSF, BHE).
Chairman's Letter — 2022
Berkshire had a 'good year' in 2022: operating earnings rose 12% to $30.9 billion (with Alleghany adding $1.1 billion, excluding Apple), while GAAP net income swung with $20.7 billion of unrealized losses on stocks. Buffett stresses operating earnings — not the mark-to-market GAAP figure — as the true measure. Float grew from $147 billion to $164 billion (8,000-fold since 1967). The letter also sets future governance rules (the CEO is the Chief Risk Officer and must tie net worth to Berkshire stock) and recounts Berkshire's enormous federal-tax payments and its four 'giants.'
Chairman's Letter — 2021
Buffett opens the 2021 letter by saying there was 'little action of that sort' (few big deals) but 'reasonable progress' in growing intrinsic value, his 57-year primary duty. He organizes Berkshire into four 'giants' and a host of smaller businesses, explains why stocks are easier to enter and exit than negotiated acquisitions, and recounts the history of Berkshire Hathaway itself (from two failing textile mills). Float grew $9 billion to ~$147 billion; Apple (5.6%) is the runner-up giant, its buybacks lifting Berkshire's look-through earnings to $5.6 billion.
Chairman's Letter — 2020
Berkshire reported GAAP earnings of $42.5 billion in 2020 (a COVID year): $21.9 billion of operating earnings (down 9%), $4.9 billion realized gains, $26.7 billion of unrealized gains, and an $11 billion impairment write-down on a few subsidiaries. Buffett met neither goal — no sizable acquisition and lower operating earnings — but increased intrinsic value by retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of the shares. He devotes a full section to how Apple's own buybacks lifted Berkshire's indirect ownership from 5.2% to 5.4%, and reports float of $138 billion.
Chairman's Letter — 2019
Berkshire reported GAAP earnings of $81.4 billion in 2019, but $53.7 billion of that was simply an unrealized mark-to-market gain forced by the post-2018 accounting rule — Buffett uses the 2018 ($4 billion) vs. 2019 swing to show how 'crazy' the rule makes reported earnings. The operating businesses earned a record $24 billion. Berkshire committed $10 billion to Occidental Petroleum (preferred + warrants), grew Apple to 5.7%, and ran BNSF/BHE for $8.3 billion. The letter also reflects at length on acquisitions ('like marriage') and on Buffett's own 99% net-worth-in-Berkshire pledge.
Chairman's Letter — 2018
The 2018 letter is a milestone: Buffett announces that Berkshire will retire the long-run 'percentage change in per-share book value' yardstick because it no longer tracks intrinsic value, and because a new accounting rule forces unrealized gains/losses through GAAP net income. GAAP earnings fell $20.6 billion on paper (mostly unrealized losses), even as operating businesses hit records. Berkshire also took a $2.8 billion Kraft Heinz intangible write-down, grew Apple to 5.4% of the company, and published a full float tutorial and a GEICO tribute as Tony Nicely stepped back.
Chairman's Letter — 2017
Berkshire's net worth jumped $65.3 billion in 2017, lifting per-share book value from $19 to $211,750 (19.1% annually) — the jump boosted by the corporate tax cut. The letter details four value-building blocks and a drought of 'elephant' deals, offset by one major stand-alone purchase (a 38.6% interest in Pilot Flying J) and a HomeServices brokerage buying spree. Berkshire also grew its Apple stake to 166.7 million shares and reaffirmed it must still make huge acquisitions to move the needle.
Chairman's Letter — 2016
Berkshire's net worth rose $27.5 billion in 2016 (+10.7%), its 52nd year under Buffett, with book value compounding from $19 to $172,108 (19% annually). The letter's centerpiece is a deep float tutorial: a single huge policy pushed total float above $100 billion, and Buffett explains why float is a 'revolving fund' worth far more than its book liability. He also reports that Duracell and Precision Castparts contributed their first partial year, and that Berkshire took an initial Apple position (61.2 million shares).
Chairman's Letter — 2015
Berkshire's net worth rose $15.4 billion in 2015, lifting per-share book value from $19 to $155,501 (19.2% annually). Buffett says intrinsic value now far exceeds book value, so Berkshire would repurchase shares at up to 120% of book. Two big stories: the Kraft Heinz merger (Berkshire's Heinz stake doubled into a 27% holding of a $27 billion-sales company) and the acquisition of Precision Castparts (becoming the 'Powerhouse Six'). He also writes at length on Berkshire's cash/float 'elephant gun' and the wrongheadedness of activist investing.
Chairman's Letter — 2014
Berkshire's net worth rose $18.3 billion in 2014, lifting per-share book value from $19 to $146,186 (19.4% compounded annually). Buffett stresses that book value is now a 'crude' proxy as intrinsic value has diverged. The Powerhouse Five earned a record $12.4 billion. Big deals included the Van Tuyl auto-dealership group and the Duracell swap with P&G, while the 3G capital partnership kept beating expectations at Heinz. He also shares an 18-page history of his own investing evolution from Graham to Munger.
Chairman's Letter — 2013
Berkshire's net worth rose $34.2 billion (+18.2%) in 2013, its 49th year under Buffett, with book value compounding from $19 to $134,973 (19.7% annually). The year's two large deals were NV Energy (bought by MidAmerican for $5.6 billion) and H.J. Heinz (a $12 billion-ish 3G Capital partnership, with Berkshire putting up $8 billion of 9%-coupon preferred plus half the common). Buffett also wrote a long, classic investing tutorial built on his farm and NYU real-estate purchases and a tribute to Ben Graham.
Chairman's Letter — 2012
Berkshire delivered a total gain of $24.1 billion to shareholders in 2012, lifting per-share book value 14.4% over the 48 years of present management. The 'powerhouse five' operating subsidiaries earned $10.1 billion. Early in 2013 Berkshire agreed to buy 50% of H.J. Heinz alongside Jorge Paulo Lemann's group. Buffett explains float mechanics (a revolving, cost-free fund), recounts GEICO's Hurricane Sandy hit (over three times Katrina), notes Todd and Ted's DIRECTV holding, and describes buying 28 newspapers for $344 million.
Chairman's Letter — 2011
Per-share book value rose 4.6% in 2011, a subpar year in which Buffett admits a major mistake on Energy Future Holdings (a $873 million write-down). The headline transactions were the Lubrizol acquisition and two marketable-security investments — IBM (63.9 million shares, $10.9 billion) and Bank of America ($5 billion of 6% preferred plus warrants). He also confirms the investing deputies: Todd Combs joined, and Ted Weschler came aboard after yearend.
Chairman's Letter — 2010
Berkshire's per-share book value rose 13% in 2010. The letter is built around intrinsic value: Buffett explains its three pillars (investments, earnings from non-invested assets, and the subjective quality of management), and uses GEICO as a worked example — bought for $2.3 billion in 1996, now worth an estimated $14 billion of economic goodwill. He also announces Todd Combs as the first of the younger investing deputies and includes his annual Memo to managers.
Chairman's Letter — 2009
Berkshire's net worth rose $21.8 billion (+19.8%) in 2009, its 45th year under Buffett, as markets recovered. The headline event was the acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), adding 65,000+ employees and making Berkshire a major railroad owner. Buffett also admits two managerial failures: a GEICO credit-card idea that lost $6.3 million pre-tax, and NetJets, whose debt spiral was stopped only after Dave Sokol took over in August.
Chairman's Letter — 2008
In the financial crisis year, Berkshire's net worth fell $11.5 billion (-9.6%) in 2008 — its first decline under Buffett and the worst relative year in 44. Yet insurance float reached $58.5 billion at zero cost for the sixth straight year. Buffett spends much of the letter defending Clayton Homes' sound lending (median FICO 644, 3.0% foreclosures) against an industry that collapsed, launches BHAC tax-exempt bond insurance, rescues Constellation Energy hours from bankruptcy, and explains his 251 derivatives as 'derivatives float' of $8.1 billion.
Chairman's Letter — 2007
Berkshire's net worth rose $12.3 billion (+11%) in 2007, its 43rd year compounding book value since present management took over. Buffett introduces his famous taxonomy of businesses — 'The Great, the Good and the Gruesome' — using See's Candy as the model 'great' business. He discloses the $4.5 billion Marmon (60%) acquisition and admits Dexter was his worst deal ever (a $3.5 billion mistake). Berkshire also exited PetroChina for about $4 billion.
Chairman's Letter — 2006
Berkshire's net worth jumped $16.9 billion (+18.4%) in 2006 — a record one-year dollar gain at the time — compounding book value from $19 to about $70,000 over 42 years. Buffett touts the global expansion (Israeli ISCAR, Fort Worth's TTI) and a landmark retroactive reinsurance deal with Equitas that added $7.12 billion of float. The Gen Re derivatives runoff is essentially finished, with only $5 million of loss in 2006 (cumulative $409 million).
Chairman's Letter — 2005
Berkshire's net worth rose $5.6 billion (+6.4%) in 2005, its 41st year under present management compounding book value from $19 to $59,377 (21.5% annually). Hurricane Katrina (plus Rita and Wilma) cost Berkshire $3.4 billion of losses, yet insurance float remained costless for the year. Buffett details five acquisitions, explains intrinsic value and the four business groups, and reports the Gen Re derivatives runoff lost another $104 million (cumulative $404 million).
Chairman's Letter — 2004
Berkshire's per-share book value rose 10.5% in 2004 while the S&P 500 (with dividends) returned 10.9%, the first time in nine years Berkshire did not beat the index; net worth grew $8.3 billion. Buffett spends the letter dissecting why Berkshire's size now makes outperformance harder, gives a detailed lesson on the three 'buckets' of capital allocation (businesses, stocks, cash), and explains the accounting pain created by the strong dollar fall on his foreign-currency and equity-put positions.
Chairman's Letter — 2003
Berkshire's net worth grew $13.6 billion (+21.0%) in 2003, the best absolute gain ever at the time, as both the equity portfolio and operating businesses performed. Buffett devotes the letter to two large themes: the superiority of 'look-through' earnings over reported GAAP earnings, and a blunt warning that the accounting profession had failed investors by endorsing fair-value/derivative marks and stock-option expensing avoidance. He also discloses the mid-year purchase of Clayton Homes and the continued build-out of the manufacturing, service and retailing ('MSR') segment.
2002 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders
2002 was a 'banner year': net worth rose $6.1 billion (10.0% book-value gain), outpacing the S&P by 32.1 points, helped by low-cost float (1% cost), strong non-insurance operations, and a rebound in marketable securities. Buffett acquires The Pampered Chef, CTB, Garan, Albecca and Fruit of the Loom, plus pipelines (Kern River, Northern Natural) via MidAmerican. A major section denounces derivatives as 'financial weapons of mass destruction,' and another critiques corporate governance and directors' 'independence.' He also revisits the General Re reserving errors ($1.31 billion charge in 2002).
2001 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders
2001 brought Berkshire's first net-worth decline under Buffett's management: a $3.77 billion loss, a 6.2% drop in book value, driven by the September 11 attacks and General Re's underwriting failures. Buffett takes personal responsibility for letting General Re operate with dangerous terrorism risk, violating his own 'Noah rule.' Acquisitions included MiTek, XTRA, Larson-Juhl and Fruit of the Loom (all cash). He explains the three underwriting principles and attacks the misleading term 'loss development.' The letter also covers the FINOVA/Berkadia transaction and a long defense of shareholder-directed charitable contributions.
2000 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders
Berkshire's net worth rose $3.96 billion in 2000, a 6.5% gain in book value, modestly beating the S&P. The year was defined by a burst of acquisitions — eight businesses for about $8 billion, 97% in cash — including MidAmerican (closed), CORT, U.S. Liability, Ben Bridge, Justin Industries, Shaw, Benjamin Moore, and Johns Manville. Buffett admits his GEICO advertising step-up failed to produce commensurate new business, and that the Dexter shoe purchase (paid in stock) was a major mistake. He revisits Aesop's 'bird in the hand' as the immutable valuation formula and warns against speculation.
1999 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders
1999 was Buffett's worst absolute and worst relative year: net worth rose just $358 million, a 0.5% gain in book value, as Berkshire's equity portfolio badly lagged the S&P. He blames himself ('my grade for 1999 most assuredly is a D') and notes the stock dropped more than the business. He acquired Jordan's Furniture and contracted to buy MidAmerican Energy, both for cash. The letter includes the story of R.C. Willey's no-Sunday Boise store (Bill Child's personal guarantee) and a long critique of pooling vs. purchase accounting and goodwill amortization.
1998 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders
In 1998 Berkshire's net worth grew $25.9 billion, a 48.3% gain in per-share book value, but Buffett stresses most of that came from issuing shares in acquisitions (General Re, Executive Jet) rather than from intrinsic value, which rose far less. He acquires General Re ($22bn) and Executive Jet, and explains the two-column table that splits Berkshire into its investment holdings and its operating businesses. GEICO 'shot the lights out' while General Re dragged operating earnings down. A long section attacks the accounting fiction of stock options, and Buffett confesses his sale of McDonald's was a mistake.
Chairman's Letter — 1997
Net worth rose $8.0 billion (+34.1%); 33-year book value compounded at 24.1% (from $19 to $25,488). Buffett calls 1997 only a 'Quack' vs. the S&P (Berkshire paid $4.2B federal tax, ~18% of beginning net worth). He introduces the 'preening duck' analogy and the two-column value table (investments per share $38,043; operating earnings per share $717.82). Two non-traditional positions: 111.2M oz of silver (+$97.4M) and $4.6B Treasury zeros (+$598.8M unrealized). A 'how we think about market fluctuations' section argues net savers should welcome lower prices. Acquisitions: Star Furniture (Melvyn Wolff, via the Blumkin/Child referral chain) and International Dairy Queen (closed early 1998). A 'Confession' shows all-stock mergers slightly destroyed shareholder value vs. cash deals. Roberto Goizueta of Coca-Cola died; USAir/Salomon preferreds revived.
Chairman's Letter — 1996
Net worth rose $6.2 billion (+36.1%, +31.8% per share); 32-year book value compounded at 23.8% (from $19 to $19,011). Two 1996 acquisitions: Kansas Bankers Surety ($75M, surfaced at a nephew's wife's birthday party) and FlightSafety International (~$1.5B, via shareholder Richard Sercer). The GEICO step-acquisition writedown of $478.4M is explained. Buffett stresses intrinsic value vs. market price — in 1996 the stock underperformed the business, making price/value 'more appropriate' than a year earlier. A huge insurance section details float (negative cost, $6.7B), super-cat exposures (Allstate Florida hurricane; California Earthquake Authority ~$1B layer), and GEICO's blowout (voluntary policies +10%, 16.9% profit-sharing). 'The Inevitables' (Coca-Cola, Gillette) essay debuts. USAir recovers; B-share offering ($565M) blunts clone trusts.
Chairman's Letter — 1995
Net worth rose $5.3 billion (+45.0%, +43.1% per share); 31-year book value compounded at 23.6% (from $19 to $14,426). Buffett jokes 'a rising tide lifts all yachts' — any fool made money in 1995. Three acquisitions of the desired type: Helzberg's Diamond Shops (met Barnett Helzberg Jr. by chance on 58th St.), R.C. Willey (via Irv Blumkin's referral), and — closing right after yearend — 100% of GEICO for $2.3 billion, completing Buffett's 45-year love affair (recounts pounding on GEICO's door in 1951 and meeting Lorimer 'Davy' Davidson). A long convertible-preferreds section includes the Gillette mistake ($625M foregone by taking preferred over common) and the USAir travails. The letter also proposes the Class B recapitalization to head off 'clone' unit trusts.
Chairman's Letter — 1994
Net worth rose $1.45 billion (+13.9%); 30-year book value compounded at 23% (from $19 to $10,083). Buffett states plainly the future won't match the past — 'A fat wallet is the enemy of superior investment results' — and that Berkshire now requires at least $100M ideas. He uses Ted Williams' 'happy zone' batting analogy for waiting for great pitches, and ignores macro forecasts ('Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist'). The Scott Fetzer case study shows how purchase-premium accounting charges depress reported book value even as intrinsic value grows (Ralph Schey's ROE would have ranked #1 on the Fortune 500). A long compensation section skewers stock options ('heads I win, tails you lose'). Mistake Du Jour: selling Cap Cities at $63 (would be $85.25 by yearend) and the USAir preferred writedown to 25¢ on the dollar.
Chairman's Letter — 1993
Per-share book value rose 14.3%; 29-year compounded rate 23.3% (from $19 to $8,854). Four non-operating accounting items hit net worth (two negative GAAP tax changes totaling ~$145M, a positive from marking all equities at market +$172M, and stock issued for Dexter Shoe +$478M). Buffett warns intrinsic value — not book — is what counts. He acquires Dexter Shoe (97,200 shoes employees; CEO Harold Alfond started at 25¢/hr) in a tax-free stock swap. A long section defends concentration over diversification dogma and demolishes academic 'beta'/risk-as-volatility theory using the Washington Post (bought 1973, became 'riskier' as it fell) counterexample. Insurance float was cost-free in 1993, but he cautions the super-cat business had a lucky year.
Chairman's Letter — 1992
Net worth rose $1.15 billion (+20.3%); 28-year book value compounded at 23.6% (from $19 to $7,745). Buffett redefines intrinsic value as discounted owner-earnings and warns it is necessarily a range, not a precise number — hence nothing Berkshire owns is 'too cheap to sell' or 'too dear to repurchase at.' He clarifies accounting fiction (depreciation rarely reflects replacement cost; goodwill from acquisitions is not expensed but internally-generated goodwill is). The year's standout was GEICO's 10-point market-share gain (from 2.0% to 3.6%) under Tony Nicely; Wells Fargo fell 44% but Buffett explains why he 'gladly bought more.' He closes with an appendix distinguishing value (price) vs. cost (what you give up), and a Salomon post-mortem (refuses to 'spare the rod').
Chairman's Letter — 1991
Net worth rose $2.1 billion (+39.6%) — 'a phenomenon not apt to be repeated': the P/E re-rating of Coca-Cola and Gillette alone accounted for ~$1.6B of the gain; 27-year book value compounded at 23.7% (from $19 to $6,437). Buffett became Interim Chairman of Salomon (Aug 1991), illustrating that operating managers are so good he could step away. He formalizes the franchise-vs-business distinction (media now 'resemble businesses more than franchises'), revisits See's 20-year anniversary ($25M price, $7M tangible net worth, $410M pre-tax distributed in 20 yrs), acquires H.H. Brown (via golf partner John Loomis), and laments the Fannie Mae omission mistake (~$1.4B foregone gain). Super-cat cost of float was 6.31% in 1991.
Chairman's Letter — 1990
Net worth rose $362 million (+7.3%) — proving Buffett's prior prediction that a down year was 'almost certain in at least one of the next three years'; 26-year book value compounded at 23.2% (from $19.46 to $4,612.06). The four permanent holdings were flat in aggregate; media prices fell for 'good reasons.' He formalizes 'look-through' earnings (~$590M in 1990), details the super-cat business and the cost-of-float table (1990: 1.63%), explains why he bought Wells Fargo (10% for under 5x after-tax earnings, ~3x pre-tax) during the bank-stock panic, and warns on junk bonds (RJR Nabisco bonds added to $440M). The 'Emily and the magic wand' tale sums up his hands-off managerial role.
Chairman's Letter — 1989
Net worth rose $1.515 billion (+44.4%) — the double-dip from both intrinsic-value gains and the market 'correcting' the prices of the permanent holdings; 25-year book value compounded at 23.8% (from $19.46 to $4,296.01). Buffett warns the 'catch-up rewards have been realized — we'll have to settle for a single-dip.' He introduces the 'look-through' earnings concept, explains deferred taxes as an interest-free loan from the Treasury, details the 1989 catastrophes (Hugo, California quake) and Berkshire's super-cat response (offered up to $250M), and recounts the Coca-Cola purchase ('I finally established contact with my eyes' in 1988) plus three new convertible preferreds (Gillette, USAir, Champion). A long section on zero-coupon/PIK bond folly (EBDIT) and 'Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years' closes the letter.
Chairman's Letter — 1988
Net worth rose $569 million (+20.0%); 24-year per-share book value compounded at 23.0% (from $19.46 to $2,974.52). Buffett flags four negatives for future returns: a less attractive market, higher corporate taxes, richer-priced acquisitions, and weaker conditions at the three permanent holdings (Cap Cities/ABC, GEICO, Washington Post). The 'Sainted Seven' earned ~67% on equity in 1988 with no leverage. He explains accounting changes (full consolidation of Mutual Savings & Scott Fetzer Financial; 1990 deferred-tax rule change), introduces a four-segment supplementary presentation outside the auditors' purview, and devotes a long section to arbitrage (Arcata/Rockwood case studies, RJR Nabisco, $78M pre-tax gain on ~$147M) and the Efficient Market Theory critique.
Chairman's Letter — 1987
Net worth rose $464 million (+19.5%); 23-year per-share book value compounded at 23.1% (from $19.46 to $2477.47). Buffett spotlights the 'Sainted Seven' non-financial units (Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, NFM, Scott Fetzer Mfg, See's, World Book), which in 1987 earned ~$180M pre-tax on only ~$175M of historical-cost equity — about a 57% return on equity. He reprises the Mr. Market parable (Ben Graham), explains why three marketable stocks (Cap Cities/ABC, GEICO, Washington Post) are held permanently, warns on auditors' inability to certify insurer loss reserves, and details the $700M Salomon convertible preferred investment.
Chairman's Letter — 1986
Net worth rose $492.5 million (+26.1%); 22-year per-share book value compounded at 23.3% (from $19.46 to $2073.06), with shares outstanding up less than 1%. Buffett separates his two jobs: (1) attracting and keeping outstanding managers (whom he leaves alone — 'if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold Palmer were willing to play for me, neither would get a lot of directives'), and (2) capital allocation, which he calls 'considerably more important' at Berkshire and which was 'tough work in 1986' — only one small acquisition (Fechheimer) and a lot of debt paydown and cash stockpiling. An appendix introduces 'owner earnings' and attacks the Wall Street 'cash flow' fallacy. Tax chapter details the adverse 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Chairman's Letter — 1985
Net worth rose $613.6 million (+48.2%) — 'neither will be seen again in my lifetime' — from $19.46 to $1643.71 per share over 21 years (23.2% compounded). Two factors cap future returns: a market offering few bargains, and Berkshire's size (equity capital 20x what it was a decade earlier). The year's big moves: purchase of a major Capital Cities/ABC position, acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, an extended Fireman's Fund quota-share, and sale of General Foods. Most notably, Buffett shuts down the original textile business, using it as a lesson on commodity economics and the limits of managerial brilliance. He also devotes a long section to the inequities of stock-option compensation.
Chairman's Letter — 1984
Net worth rose $152.6 million (+13.6%), below the historical 22.1% book-value compounded rate (from $19.46 in 1964 to $1108.77 in 1984) — Buffett warns the 22% era is history and that earning even 15% annually for the next decade would require about $3.9 billion of profits. A major theme is stock repurchases: he explains why repurchases at prices below intrinsic value benefit all shareholders, contrasts them with odious 'greenmail,' and notes Berkshire prospered from GEICO's, Washington Post's and General Foods' buybacks. The letter also contains a long, candid section on errors in loss-reserving at the insurance subsidiaries, a major WPPSS bond discussion, and a full dividend-policy essay.
Chairman's Letter — 1983
Buffett opens with a 13-point owner-relations catechism (corporate form, partnership attitude; directors are major shareholders; goal is per-share intrinsic value, not size; candor; no issuing stock unless full value received; reluctance to sell good businesses). The headline event is the acquisition of a 90% interest in Nebraska Furniture Mart from Rose Blumkin and her family. He also explains book value vs. intrinsic business value and why Berkshire's book value is a conservative proxy, and appends a long Goodwill appendix. Book value rose from $737.43 to $975.83 per share (+32%) in 1983; over 19 years of present management it grew from $19.46 to $975.83, a 22.6% annual compound.
Chairman's Letter — 1982
Operating earnings dropped to $31.5m (only 9.8% of beginning equity, from 15.2%) as insurance underwriting swung to a large loss. Buffett explains why the operating-earnings/equity yardstick no longer fits Berkshire (because of growing non-controlled holdings), and abandons it — 'shoot the arrow, then draw the bullseye.' The letter's famous sections: a $40m+ of undistributed earnings from four holdings exceeding reported earnings, the 'nostalgia' investment lesson (Washington Post + GEICO, his first commercial connections at 13 and 20), an industry-analysis of why insurance is a commodity business with over-capacity, and a full treatise on why issuing undervalued stock to buy businesses destroys owner wealth.
Chairman's Letter — 1981
Operating earnings fell to $39.7m (15.2% of beginning equity) partly due to a new shareholder-designated charitable program. The letter's centerpiece is a critique of corporate acquisition behavior — the 'toad and princess' allegory — and a long 'equity value-added' analysis showing that with long-term tax-exempt yields at 14% and corporate ROE ~14%, the typical American business is no longer worth 100 cents on the dollar to individual investors. Book value compounded 21.1%/yr over 17 years to $526.02.
Chairman's Letter — 1980
A deep dive into the 'accounting vs economic' earnings gap: Berkshire's retained earnings in companies it doesn't control (under 20% owned) now exceed total reported operating earnings — the 'earnings iceberg' with less than half visible. The letter also delivers the 'hamburger' test of real (inflation-adjusted) returns, explains why long-term bonds are dangerous in inflation, and reaffirms that GEICO's 33% interest (cost $47m) may account for ~40% of Berkshire's reported earnings in undistributed earnings.
Chairman's Letter — 1979
Buffett formalizes the return-on-equity yardstick (18.6% in 1979, down from 18.8% on a restated base) and delivers his famous 'investor's misery index' — that inflation plus the taxes owed to convert earnings into cash can shrink real capital even when a business earns 20% on equity. The letter also rails against long-term bonds in an inflationary world ('Neither a short-term borrower nor a long-term lender be') and explains why Berkshire cultivates a stable, long-term shareholder base.
Chairman's Letter — 1978
The Diversified Retailing merger forces a full consolidation of Blue Chip Stamps, muddying the accounts; Buffett explains why he still judges performance by operating earnings on beginning equity (19.4% in 1978, near the 1972 record). The letter is a tour of each operating unit — textiles, insurance, See's, the Buffalo News, banking — and a long case for concentrating equity holdings in a few excellent businesses bought cheap (SAFECO at under book value).
Chairman's Letter — 1977
Buffett argues that return on equity capital, not earnings per share, is the honest measure of managerial performance — then reports 19% on beginning equity while conceding the textile business had another poor year.
Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1976
After two poor years, 1976 rebounded: operating earnings of $16,073,000 ($16.47 per share), a 17.3% return on equity. Insurance underwriting recovered sharply (Berkshire's combined ratio improved from 115.4 to 98.7), led by Phil Liesche's National Indemnity team. He publishes the full equity portfolio (total equities $75.4M, led by GEICO and Washington Post) and re-states his concentration philosophy. Illinois National Bank earned ~2% of assets (about 50% above National City's 'best' 1.34%). He notes the bank must be divested by December 31, 1980 per law, likely via a 1980 spin-off.
Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1975
Buffett reports the worst year yet: 1975 operating earnings of $6,713,592 ($6.85 per share), a 7.6% return on equity — lowest since 1967. The property-casualty industry had "its worst year in history," hurt by economic and "social" inflation. He discloses a major new equity position — 467,150 shares of Washington Post "B" stock ($10.6M cost) intended to be held permanently — and explains his buy-and-hold criteria. A large part of 1975 earnings came from a one-off Federal income tax refund that will not recur in 1976. The Waumbec Mills acquisition and K & W Products purchase are described.
Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1974
Buffett reports a weak 1974: operating earnings of $8,383,576 ($8.56 per share), a 10.3% return on equity — the lowest since 1970. The cause was a collapse in insurance underwriting as inflation ran ~1% per month while rates stayed flat, hammering profit margins. He explains the bond math (190 basis-point yield rise cut the $120M municipal portfolio's market value below carrying value) and notes the stock portfolio fell ~$17M below cost. Textiles and the bank did well; Home & Auto's Florida expansion was a "disastrous" mistake. The Diversified Retailing merger was terminated in January 1975.
Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1973
Buffett reports 1973 operating earnings of $11,930,592, a 17.4% return on beginning equity (down from 19.8% as equity grew faster than earnings), or $12.18 per share. Jack Ringwalt retired as president of National Indemnity after a brilliant record since 1940. The letter details the Diversified Retailing merger (to add Blue Chip Stamps exposure), Berkshire's growing Blue Chip stake (~22.5%), and the accounting dispute with Peat Marwick over recognizing Blue Chip's unaudited current-year earnings. Sun Newspapers won a Pulitzer Prize. He flags 1974 returns will decline further on the enlarged equity base.
Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1972
Buffett reports a "highly satisfactory" 1972 with operating earnings of $11,116,256, a 19.8% return on beginning equity — the best ever to that point. Insurance underwriting profit surged on low accident frequency and no major catastrophes, but he warns this attracted unsustainable competition. He highlights three successful acquisitions (National Indemnity's founders, Illinois Bank, and Home & Auto) run by their original owners. Book value per share compounded about 16.5% annually since 1964 despite no new equity capital and a 14% reduction in shares outstanding.
Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1971
Buffett reports 1971 operating earnings of $5,745,361, a 14.2% return on beginning equity and $3.43 per share (up from $2.69 in 1970). Highlights include a record year for insurance underwriting, strong textile results, and a banking subsidiary that earned about 2% on average deposits. He stresses that the better results come from improved operations rather than acquisitions, and discusses the dual effect of the 1970 acquisitions on comparability. He also explains that insurance investment income will grow rapidly as cash from the 1970-71 bond purchases compounds.
Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1970
Buffett's first letter signed as Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. records operating earnings of $4,516,503 (a 10.0% return on beginning equity) and $2.69 per share. He reports a good year in textiles and insurance underwriting, and notes that insurance investment income rose meaningfully on higher premium volume. He also flags a key limitation: the 1970 figure benefited from the inclusion of earnings from businesses acquired in 1970, so year-over-year comparisons would be distorted if those were excluded — and states he intends to report such "look-through" effects openly.
Buffett Partnership Letters
Letters to partners of Buffett Partnership Ltd. (1956–1969).
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1969
Buffett's October 9, 1969 letter — the liquidation calendar and the case for bonds. He details the wind-down timetable (30-day retirement notice late November; controlled-company material in December; ~64% cash + DRC/B-H stock distribution around Jan 5; Harding opens a Ruane Cunniff Omaha office March 1, 1970). The letter introduces Bill Ruane as successor manager (met at Graham's Columbia class in 1951; accounts averaged > 40%/yr 1956–61 and 1964–68, but −50% in 1962) and makes a striking argument: for the first time in his lifetime, 'passive investment in tax-free bonds (≈6½%) is likely to be fully the equivalent of expectations from professionally managed money in stocks' — only 'modestly inferior' to truly excellent management.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1969
Buffett's December 5, 1969 letter — the controlled-company primer. He supplies published material on DRC and B-H and gives his 'slant' on each. DRC (BPL owns 800k/1M shares) just sold Hochschild, Kohn to Supermarkets General for ~$11M and owns Associated Retail Stores (net worth ~$7.5M). B-H (691,441/983,582 shares) has three businesses: a poor textile operation (~$16/share capital, inadequate return), plus first-class insurance (National Indemnity/Fire & Marine, ~$15/share) and the Illinois National Bank (97.7% owned, ~$17/share). Tangible book ~$43/share, stated ~$45; he expects intrinsic value to grow ~10%/yr and will hold 'a very long period,' but stresses no managerial or moral commitment to partners post-liquidation.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1969
Buffett's December 26, 1969 letter — distribution finalized and 13 Q&As. The Jan 5, 1970 check will be ~64% of Jan 1 1969 capital (better timing than liquidating end-1968: income-seekers get ~40% more after-tax than a year earlier). The Blue Chip Stamps offering fell through (price dropped; BPL withdrew its 371,400 shares, will hold or distribute later). He answers 13 partner questions, most importantly why B-H stock wasn't registered for free trading: distributing 691,441 shares into a chaotic market would hurt less-sophisticated partners, so sales are confined to private placements where all partners get the same yearend-valuation-based price. He ends: 'Should I hold BH or DRC?... I'm going to do so and I plan to buy more.'
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1969
Buffett's February 25, 1970 letter — a 10-page 'Tax-Free Bond Primer' written to help partners deploy the large cash distribution. It covers bond mechanics (bearer vs registered, coupons, custody accounts), taxation (federal tax-free; state rules for NE/NY/CA; discount = capital gain; don't carry tax-free bonds on bank loans), marketability (hundreds of thousands of issues, wide bid-ask spreads — avoid illiquid local-dealer pushes), where he'll buy (toll roads/utilities, Industrial Development Authority bonds, Housing Authority AAA, state obligations — explicitly NOT big-city bonds he can't analyze), callable-bond traps, yield-curve/maturity math, and discount vs full-coupon bonds (banks pushed out of the discount market by the 1969 Tax Reform Act). He'll concentrate purchases in the 10–25 year range at ~6½% after-tax.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1969
Buffett's May 29, 1969 letter — the retirement announcement. He says he will give formal notice before yearend to retire, because (1) quantitatively-based bargains have 'virtually disappeared,' (2) BPL's $100M of assets rules out sub-$3M commitments (and thus sub-$100M companies), and (3) performance-chasing has made markets more speculative. Crucially, the real reason is personal: 'The only way to slow down is to stop' — while on stage he can't help being competitive. He lays out a liquidation plan: suggesting Bill Ruane as successor manager, letting partners take cash or keep proportional stakes in the controlled companies (DRC, B-H, plus one restricted holding), and predicts a breakeven 1969 due to 'atrocious' workout results he calls 100% his fault.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1968
Buffett's November 1, 1968 cover to 1969 partners. Encloses the 1969 commitment letter and Ground Rules, and confirms yearend valuations of the two control holdings: Diversified Retailing at $8.8M (up from $7.2M, cost $4.8M) and Berkshire Hathaway at $31/share (up from $25; market ~$37, so the control valuation sits below market and is 'of virtually no importance'). He reaffirms the 'no admittance' policy (turned down spouses, children, grandchildren) and notes the 1969 idea backlog is 'virtually nil.'
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1968
Buffett's 1968 annual letter (Jan 22, 1969). BPL's best year ever: +58.8% (limited partners +45.6%) vs the Dow's +7.7% — he calls it a 'freak like picking up thirteen spades' and tells partners to 'pocket the money and then get back to work.' The $40.0M gain was driven by a single Private Owner idea ('the cash register really rang'); all four categories worked. He stresses the quantity/quality of ideas is at an 'all time low,' that the go-go funds are fading (Tsai's Manhattan Fund −6.9%), and opens 1969 with $104.4M net assets — closing with a nostalgic look back at the $105,100, seven-partner 1956 start.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1968
Buffett's 1968 mid-year letter (July 11, 1968). Dow was an 'anemic competitor' again (H1 +0.9%), while BPL gained 16% (limited partners +13.5%). He warns the marketable portfolio is 'heavily concentrated in a few situations' so results are 'potentially more volatile.' The letter encloses Diversified Retailing Company's first annual report (BPL owns 80%; DRC is public to creditors via $ debentures but private in ownership), reports controlled companies will earn > $3M in 1968, and closes with a sharp warning about a 'chain-letter type stock-promotion vogue' (a mania) swelling in the markets.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1967
Buffett's October 9, 1967 letter — the pivotal notice that he is lowering BPL's long-term goal. Four factors: (1) the market environment has killed quantitatively-based bargains, (2) a 'tidal wave' of performance-chasing has made markets hyper-reactive, (3) capital has grown to ~$65M against a 'diminishing trickle' of ideas, and (4) his personal motivation now favors a less compulsive life. New goal: the lesser of 9% per annum or a 5-point advantage over the Dow. He also explains qualitative vs quantitative schools and that the 'sensational' money came from rare qualitative insights.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1967
Buffett's November 1, 1967 cover to 1968 partners. Encloses the 1968 commitment letter, a tax letter (noting ~$24M of gains realized this year), the February 2 figures, and the revised 'Ground Rules' with rules four and five changed to reflect the October 9 goal reduction. As written, the Dow is ~880 and BPL ~+27% (limited partners ~+22%); ~$36M sits in controlled companies + short-term governments and 'clearly will not participate' in any market rise.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1967
Buffett's 1967 annual letter (Jan 24, 1968). BPL returned +35.9% (limited partners +28.4%) vs Dow +19.0% — beating the old 10-point goal, with a $19.4M overall gain and $27.4M realized taxable income. But 1967 was a speculative 'rained gold' year when 'at least 95%' of funds beat the Dow, and BPL's worst-ever workout return (0.89%). Controlled companies added National Indemnity (Jack Ringwalt) and Associated Cotton Shops (Ben Rosner). He opens 1968 with $68.1M net assets; ~$1.6M withdrew after the goal reduction.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1967
Buffett's 1967 mid-year letter (July 12, 1967). After a sour January (BPL +3.3% vs Dow +8.5%), H1 finished ~+21% (limited partners +17.3%), a 9.6-point edge. H1 gains came solely from the 63.3% in marketable securities — controlled companies (DRC 80%-owned, B-H) were left un-revalued. He flags B-H's textile business faces 'real difficulties' with no good return in prospect (a drag if the Dow keeps rising), reports $16.36M unrealized gains at Jan 1 and $7.08M realized by June 30, and previews an October 'special letter' on evolutionary Ground Rules changes.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1966
Buffett's November 1, 1966 cover to 1967 partners. He encloses the commitment letter, a tax estimate, and the annual 'Ground Rules,' and reiterates the door is shut to new capital (only non-capital contributions allowed). The letter candidly warns the second half has been much harder — margin over the Dow holds near 17 points but the year-to-date is only ~+4%, with a real chance of a net minus and a carry-forward deficiency below +6%. It also restates the control-valuation philosophy (Berkshire at halfway between net current asset value and book value) and the responsibility to possibly mark Berkshire/H-K down at yearend.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1966
Buffett's 1966 annual letter (Jan 25, 1967) — 'The First Decade.' BPL's 10th anniversary set an all-time record 36-point margin: +20.4% (limited partners +16.8%) vs Dow −15.6%. He is candid the prior decade can't repeat (capital $54,065,345, one-fifth to one-tenth as many ideas), breaks down 1966's $8,906,701 gain by category, explains how short-term performance can conflict with long-term maximization (a tender offer forced selling a large 'Private Owner' position for $1,269,181), and affirms the team's > $10M skin in the game.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1966
Buffett's 1966 mid-year letter (July 12, 1966). The Dow fell 8.7% in H1 while BPL gained 8.2% (limited partners +7.7%) — a 16.9-point advantage he calls 'decidedly abnormal.' It debuts the famous '$100,000 across eight of the world's largest companies' illustration (those giants would have been worth $83,370, a 16.6% loss), redefines 'conservatism' vs 'conventionalism,' announces the negotiated purchase of Hochschild, Kohn & Co. (BPL's first whole-business buy), and restates Ground Rule 6 on why he refuses to forecast markets.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1965
Buffett's November 1, 1965 commitment-letter cover to 1966 partners. He distributes the commitment letter and an updated 'Ground Rules,' specifically flagging the new Ground Rule 7 (concentration up to 40% in a single security). The letter confirms the partnership now owns a controlling interest in Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (a publicly-traded security) and will value that position at yearend halfway between net current asset value and book value.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1965
Buffett's 1965 annual letter (dated Jan 20, 1966). BPL posted its widest margin ever — +47.2% (limited partners +36.9%) vs the Dow's +14.2% — making the partnership $12,304,060 richer. It expands on measurement and candor, introduces 'The Sorrows of Compounding' (capital reached $43,645,000), and for the first time closes the partnership to new outside capital. The centerpiece is the Berkshire Hathaway case: purchases began at $7.60/share in 1962, average cost $14.86, control taken in spring 1965, with net working capital of ~$19/share at year-end. It also adds Ground Rule 7 (concentration up to 40%) and a long essay on why over-diversification is illogical.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1965
Buffett's 1965 mid-year letter (July 9, 1965). BPL gained 10.4% in the first half (limited partners +9.3%) vs a Dow gain of just 0.8%, a 9.6-point advantage. Notably, the gain came during the market upswing (not the decline), and he candidly admits this contradicts his usual 'better in declining markets' pattern. The letter also reports the acquisition of a controlling interest in one of the 'General Private Owner' situations (later revealed as Berkshire Hathaway) and explains the 6% advance-payment/advance-withdrawal facility.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1964
Buffett's 1964 annual letter (dated Jan 18, 1965). The partnership gained 27.8% (limited partners 22.3%) vs a Dow gain of 18.7% — the smallest margin since 1959. It expands the method from three to four categories, retells the Manhattan Indians compounding parable, deepens the conservatism essay, states long-term goals, and sharply critiques 'swap funds' and tax-driven investing.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1964
Mid-1964 semi-annual letter (dated July 8, 1964). The Dow rose 10.9% in H1 while the partnership gained 12.0% (limited partners 10.5%) — almost matching the index, which Buffett calls 'not one of our better years' for beating the Dow. He reiterates that buying is ~90% of the job and that the three Generals holdings where BPL is largest shareholder keep being accumulated patiently.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1963
November 6, 1963 letter to partners for 1964 enclosing the amended agreement, 'The Ground Rules,' and the 1964 commitment letter. As of end-October the Dow was +18.8% and the partnership ~+32%; a satisfactory sale of Dempster's operating assets was made about a month earlier.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1963
Buffett's 1963 annual letter (dated Jan 18, 1964). The partnership gained 38.7% (limited partners 30.5%) vs a Dow gain of 20.7% — a 17.7-point margin he calls unattainable long-term. Includes the Mona Lisa compounding parable, the three-category method, the Texas National Petroleum workout case, and the complete Dempster Mill exit (sold to First Beatrice Corp., realizing ~$80/share).
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1963
Mid-1963 semi-annual letter (dated July 10, 1963). The Dow rose 10.0% in H1 while the partnership gained 14% (ex-Dempster). Dempster's asset conversion continued under Harry Bottle, lifting its adjusted value from $51.26 to $64.81 per share. Buffett also explains his tax philosophy at length.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1962
A November 1, 1962 letter to partners for 1963 enclosing the amended partnership agreement and commitment letters. Buffett reports that Dempster Mill's asset conversion (under Harry Bottle) was the high point of 1962, lifting its value from ~$35 to at least $50 per share.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1962
Buffett's 1962 annual letter (dated Jan 18, 1963). The partnership gained 13.9% (limited partners 11.9%) vs a Dow decline of 7.6%. It opens with seven 'Ground Rules,' a 'Joys of Compounding' table, the full three-category method, and the complete Dempster Mill control case (Harry Bottle's turnaround).
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1962
A mid-1962 semi-annual letter (dated July 6, 1962). The Dow fell 21.7% in H1 1962 while the partnership lost only 7.5% — Buffett reprints his 1961 'prediction' section and reiterates the goal of roughly a 1/2% decline for each 1% drop in the Dow.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1961
Buffett's 1961 annual letter (dated Jan 24, 1962). The seven full-year partnerships gained 45.9% vs the Dow's 22.2%. It introduces his famous three-category 'method of operation' (generals, work-outs, control), the Dempster Mill control case, a treatise on true conservatism, and a ten-year prediction of 15–17% annual returns.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1961
A mid-year (July 1961) semi-annual letter to partners — the first of what became twice-yearly letters. The Dow rose ~13% in H1 1961 and all full-period partnerships beat it; the bulk of the letter lays out the proposed consolidation of all partnerships into one Buffett Partnership, Ltd.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1960
Buffett's 1960 letter (dated Jan 30, 1961). The Dow fell 6.3% but the seven full-year partnerships gained 22.8%; he gives a four-year track record table and walks through the classic Sanborn Map Co. 'control situation' in detail.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1959
Buffett's 1959 letter (dated Feb 20, 1960). The Dow rose 19.9% and the six full-year partnerships averaged ~25.9%; he flags the market's 'speculative component' and discloses a large position that has grown to ~35% of assets.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1958
Buffett's 1958 letter (dated Feb 11, 1959). The Dow advanced 38.5% and the five full-year partnerships averaged slightly better; he uses the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City case study to explain his 'buy undervalued, be patient' method.
Buffett Partnership Letter - 1957
Buffett's second annual letter to limited partners (dated 1957). He reiterates that the general market is priced above intrinsic value, explains the 'work-out' vs 'undervalued situation' distinction, and reports the three 1956 partnerships gained ~6–25% versus a Dow loss of about 8.5%.
Buffett Associates, Ltd. — Certificate of Limited Partnership
Not an investment letter but the founding Certificate of Limited Partnership for Buffett Associates, Ltd., dated May 1, 1956 — the original document that created Warren Buffett's first investment partnership (seven limited partners, ~$105,000 total).
Apply Buffett's Principles to Real Stocks
Open any company across the three tools — Score, Moat, and DCF — to see how his criteria score today's market.
How ValueOS Builds This Analysis
Every figure and quote on this page comes from primary sources — Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letters filed with the SEC and the underlying public company filings. We never substitute estimates or AI-generated numbers for reported data. For our full sourcing and editorial standards, read the Editorial Policy.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many Warren Buffett shareholder letters are there?
ValueOS publishes 88 letters in full: the Buffett Partnership Ltd. letters from 1956–1969 and every Berkshire Hathaway chairman letter from 1970 through 2024. Each is annotated with concept definitions and company mentions.
Where can I read Buffett's letters for free?
You can read every letter free on ValueOS, searchable by year and by concept. The original texts are filed with the SEC as part of Berkshire Hathaway's annual reports.
What's the difference between the Partnership and Berkshire letters?
The Partnership letters (1956–1969) are Buffett's writings to the limited partners of Buffett Partnership Ltd., focused on his early investment partnerships. The Berkshire letters (1970–2024) are his chairman's letters to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, covering capital allocation, acquisitions, and market commentary at scale.